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Abstract
This paper uses household, school, and test score data from Bangladesh
to compare and contrast the eﬀectiveness of NGO-run and state-run schools
in the provision of primary education. I study how the entry of NGOs in
primary education has aﬀected educational outcomes of girls and examine the
mechanisms which account for the relative performance of NGO versus state
schools in improving female educational outcomes. The results show that the
entry of NGO schools has significantly increased girls’ enrollment as compared
to boys. Constructing cohorts from cross-sectional data using year of birth and
year of NGO school establishment, I show that cohorts which were exposed to
NGO schools have higher probability of enrollment and the eﬀect operates
mainly through girls. The two most prominent characteristics of NGO schools
that encourage girls’ enrollment are the high percentage of female teachers and
having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs). NGO schools show strong eﬀects
in improving children’s test scores.
Keywords: NGOs, non-formal schools, girls’ education, Bangladesh.
JEL classification: I21, O15.
∗I am most grateful to my supervisor, Robin Burgess, for his continuous guidance and support. I
have also benefited from discussions with Shaheen Akter, Mohammad Asadullah, Oriana Bandiera,
Nicholas Barr, Tim Besley, Frank Cowell, Jean Dreze, Maitreesh Ghatak, Altaf Hossain, Geeta
Kingdon, Shira Klien, Samir Nath, Imran Rasul, Paul Schultz, Pojanart Sunirand, researchers at
BRAC’s Research and Evaluation Division, and seminar participants at EOPP, CSAE-STICERD,
and CEPR workshops, and NEUDC 2003 conference. Financial support from the Department of
Economics (LSE), and STICERD is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are my own.
†Address for correspondence: Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton
Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. E-mail: p.sukontamarn@lse.ac.uk; tel: +44 (0)207
955 6687; fax: +44 (0)207 955 6951.
1
1 Introduction
There has been a significant increase in the number and roles of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) around the world in the last few decades.1 In developing
countries NGOs have become heavily involved in the provision of public goods and
services including health care, education, and rural credit.2 As NGOs are rapidly
becoming important providers of public goods in developing countries, a key issue is
to understand how they perform relative to the state.
The objective of this paper is to examine how NGO expansion aﬀects educational
attainment. Education is one area which has typically been preserved for the state
but has seen an increasing role for NGOs, where NGO involvement is often intended
to overcome state failure in the delivery of education. Whether and how NGO
involvement aﬀects educational outcomes is an important issue which has attracted
the interests of several researchers. For example, Miguel and Kremer (2003) find that
an NGO program of school-based mass treatment with deworming drugs in Kenya
is eﬀective in reducing school absenteeism. Banerjee et al. (2003) find an NGO
remedial education program in India, where young women from the community are
hired to teach children who lag behind in class, to be eﬀective in improving children’s
test scores. A school meals program implemented by an NGO is found to increase
school participation in Kenya (Vermeersch, 2002).
One of the key problems with studying NGOs and evaluating their eﬀects relative
to the state is the fact that they are highly heterogeneous group. This motivated the
paper’s focus on Bangladesh, where there is one large NGO in primary education.
With a large NGO operating under a single model, I can make clear comparisons
between NGO-run and state-run schools and identify the characteristics of each type
of school that aﬀect educational outcomes.
Using a large, nationally representative data from the Education Watch Project in
Bangladesh, the paper studies the eﬀects of NGO schools on the educational outcomes
of girls. Bangladesh is an important case study because the country is home to a
large number of active NGOs3, and NGOs play an important role in the provision of
primary education. Moreover, there has been a rapid increase in the enrollment rate
of girls in recent years such that Bangladesh is now the only country in South Asia
to have achieved gender equity in primary enrollment.4 Eliminating gender disparity
1In the U.S. there are approximately 2 million NGOs, most of which were formed in the past
30 years, while in Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, at present
the number is at least 65,000 (The Economist, 2000). Between 1990 and 2000 the number of
international NGOs has grown by almost 20% to 37,281 (Human Development Report, 2002).
2Besley and Ghatak (2001) analyze how ownership matters in public good provision, with appli-
cations to NGOs.
3NGOs in Bangladesh are documented as being one of the most active in the world. There are
about 20,000 NGOs operating in Bangladesh’s 86,000 villages providing education, health, small
loans, and agricultural extension services (The Economist, 1998).
4In 1980, net primary enrollment rates for boys and girls were 62% and 47%; in 2000 the corre-
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in primary education is a key part of the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals.5 The education of girls is recognized as crucial to development, leading to
higher economic productivity, lower infant and maternal mortality, and improved
health. Understanding what factors led to gender parity in primary education and
identifying the role that NGOs played in this process is a key challenge. Bangladesh’s
experience can provide useful policy lessons for other countries aiming to achieve
gender equity in primary enrollment.
NGOs in Bangladesh initiated non-formal primary education in the middle of
1980s as it was perceived that primary education provided by the government could
not reach the poorest children in remote areas. Non-formal education has many char-
acteristics that diﬀer from formal education. For example, parents and the teacher
decide together on the timing of the lessons and vacation schedules. The schools
usually have one classroom and one teacher. In most cases teachers are female, which
is believed to encourage the enrollment of girls. At present, around 1.4 million chil-
dren or 8% of the children enrolled in primary schools are in NGOs’ non-formal
schools (henceforth NGO schools). Figure 1 shows the expansion of NGO schools
in Bangladesh. The largest NGO in the field of education is the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC), which provides non-formal education to 1.2 out
of 1.4 million children receiving non-formal education. Even schools which are run
by NGOs other than BRAC tend to follow the BRAC model. I therefore have the
advantage of comparing a largely homogenous group of NGO schools with state-run
schools.
Nationally representative data from the Education Watch Project shows that, in
1998, gender gap in primary enrollment in favor of boys existed only in the case of
urban households which reported their economic status as ‘surplus’. As Figures 2A,
2B, and 2C show, girls from rural areas, and girls from poorer households appear to
do better than boys in terms of net primary enrollment. In particular, girls from
rural BRAC target households, which are the poorest households in Bangladesh,
and girls from households which reported their economic status as ‘always in deficit’
have notably higher enrollment rate compared to boys. In many other developing
countries, the opposite is true. For example, in India and Nepal, gender gap in favor
of boys is greatest in rural areas and for poorer households, as Figures 3A and 3B
show. Why do girls from rural areas and poorer households in Bangladesh have such
high enrollment rates relative to boys? One possible explanation could be the works
of NGOs such as BRAC, as NGO schools in Bangladesh target poorer households.
To investigate these issues I use household, school, and test score data from the
Education Watch Project to analyze the eﬀects of NGO schools on the educational
sponding rates were 79.8% and 79.9%, respectively.
5Goal 3, namely “Promote gender equality and empower women”, has the specific target to
“Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all
levels of education no later than 2015.” Details of the Millennium Development Goals can be found
at www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ and www.developmentgoals.org.
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outcomes of girls in Bangladesh. Combining household and school data, I first study
how the entry of NGO schools aﬀects girls’ enrollment as compared to boys. I then
analyze the characteristics of NGO and state schools which aﬀect girls’ enrollment.
Finally, I investigate the learning outcomes of students attending NGO and state
schools using test score data.
Constructing cohorts from cross-sectional data using year of birth and year of
NGO school establishment, I show that cohorts which were exposed to NGO schools
have higher probability of enrollment, and the eﬀect operates mainly through girls.
Moreover, for primary school aged children, living in a village with at least one
NGO school, or a village with higher NGO school involvement, is associated with
higher probability of enrollment for girls as compared to boys, controlling for other
factors. When rural and urban areas are studied separately, the eﬀects of NGO
schools in increasing girls’ enrollment are found mainly in the rural areas. Moreover,
the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment are stronger for BRAC
target households6 compared to non-target households, suggesting that NGO schools
increase girls’ enrollment more for poorer households as BRAC target households are
the poorest group of the population. The two most prominent characteristics of NGO
schools that encourage girls’ enrollment are the high percentage of female teachers
and having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs). Being enrolled in an NGO school
has positive and strongly significant eﬀects on children’s test scores, as measured by
Assessment of Basic Competencies (ABC) test.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical frame-
work showing how NGO school entry might aﬀect girls’ educational outcomes. Sec-
tion three discusses the institutional background and the data. Section four describes
the methodology and presents the results. Section five concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The simple model in this section attempts to capture how NGO schools might aﬀect
the enrollment of girls as compared to boys. The main assumption is that there
exists a disutility associated with sending a child to school, which diﬀers by gender
and by school type.7
Given household characteristics and characteristics of schools available, household
i chooses expenditure on the education of child i to maximize the following household
6BRAC target households are defined as households with less than 0.5 acre of land and at least
1 person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a year (Nath, 1999).
7Possible reasons for gender diﬀerences in human capital investments include diﬀerent expected
returns by gender, diﬀerent costs of investment, and tastes, which may reflect social and cultural
norms (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). For example, Alderman and King (1998) assume diﬀerent rates
of returns and diﬀerent expected transfers to explain diﬀerences in school enrollment. Garg and
Morduch (1998a and 1998b) assume higher rates of return for males.
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utility function:
B(xs)− pskj + U(Y − ckj − xs) (1)
where B(·) and U(·) are household i’s perceived benefits of education and utility from
current consumption, respectively.8 B(·) and U(·) are assumed to be increasing and
concave. xs is expenditure on the education of a child of sex s, s = male (m) and
female (f). pskj is the disutility associated with sending a child of sex s to school
type k in village of residence j. Here k = government school (g) and NGO school
(n). Y is household i’s income, and ckj is the opportunity cost of time of a child
when enrolled in school type k in village j.
The main assumption of the model is that, for each village j, pfgj > pmgj =
pmnj = pfnj. The disutility of sending a child to a government school is higher for
girls compared to boys. In the context of Bangladesh, this could be thought of as the
worry of having the child far away from home, which is usually greater in the case of
girls, or the disutility of having a girl taught by male teachers. The average distance
between a government school and children’s homes is 3.2 kilometers, and over 60%
of teachers in government schools are male (Jalaluddin and Chowdhury, 1996). The
disutility of sending a child to an NGO school is assumed to be the same for boys and
girls, and is equal to the disutility of sending a boy to a government school. NGO
schools have some characteristics that should be associated with lower disutility for
girls compared to government schools. For example, NGO schools are usually built
in the village nearby to children’s homes, and over 90% of NGO school teachers are
female.
The benefit function, B(·), is assumed to be the same for boys and girls, and the
same for government schools and NGO schools. The opportunity cost of time is
assumed to be the same for boys and girls9, and higher in the case of government
schools compared to NGO schools. This is because NGO schools are located nearby
to children’s homes and have class times decided by parents and the teacher to allow
children to work outside of school time.
Let x∗s(Y ) be the solution to the maximization problem (1), and let V (Y ) be the
maximum value function, given pskj and ckj. If household i decides not to enrol the
child, the household utility is U(Y ). The condition for household i to enrol the child
is therefore:
V (Y )− U(Y ) > 0 (2)
It is straightforward to show that initial enrollment is non-decreasing with respect
to Y , and non-increasing with respect to pskj and ckj.10 This is intuitive, since high
8Subscript i is omitted for simplicity.
9Girls may help with child care and household chores while boys may work in the farm, thus in
general it is inconclusive whether the opportunity cost of time is higher for girls or boys (Strauss
and Thomas, 1995).
10Applying the envelope theorem, the derivative of the left-hand side of (2) is ∂V∂Y −
∂U
∂Y =
∂U(Y−ckj−xs)
∂Y −
∂U(Y )
∂Y > 0 since U(·) is concave. Moreover, ∂V∂pskj = −1 < 0 and ∂V∂ckj = −∂U∂Y < 0 .
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income makes it more ‘aﬀordable’ to enrol a child, while high disutility associated
with sending a child to school and high opportunity cost make it more ‘expensive’ to
enrol a child.
Let Y ∗skj be the threshold level of income above which a household will enrol a
child of sex s in school type k in village j, i.e., V (Y ∗skj) − U(Y ∗skj) = 0. Since
pfnj = pmnj = pmgj < pfgj and cnj < cgj, it follows that:
Y ∗fnj = Y
∗
mnj < Y
∗
mgj < Y
∗
fgj (3)
Result 1: NGO schools contribute to an increase in the enrollment rates of boys
and girls, with stronger eﬀects for girls.
Let us further assume that NGOs target poor households with income less than
Y tg. Suppose Y tg is such that (i) Y ∗mn = Y
∗
fn < Y
∗
mg < Y
tg < Y ∗fg, or (ii) Y
∗
mn = Y
∗
fn <
Y tg < Y ∗mg < Y
∗
fg.
Result 2: The eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment relative
to boys will be stronger for NGOs’ target households. Moreover, gender gap in
enrollment disappears for target households, but exists for non-target households.
3 The Program
With over 20,000 NGOs working in areas such as health, education, micro-credit and
agricultural services, Bangladesh is documented as having one of the most active
NGOs in the world. NGOs in Bangladesh started to emerge after the War of Inde-
pendence in 1971, when the country was in a state of upheaval and many refugees
were returning home. At that time, most NGOs were aid and relief agencies. As the
needs of society changed, many NGOs evolved into development agencies. The num-
ber of NGOs has also increased significantly. NGOs in Bangladesh range from small
local NGOs to large and internationally well-known NGOs such as the Bangladesh
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Grameen Bank. In the area of ed-
ucation, NGOs in Bangladesh play a vital role in the provision of non-formal primary
education.
Primary education in Bangladesh was initially the responsibility of the state.
After independence, under an Act of Parliament all primary schools in Bangladesh
were nationalized in 1973 (Jalaluddin and Chowdhury, 1996). From the second half of
1980s, however, the state has allowed NGOs to experiment with a variety of delivery
mechanisms to cater for basic education needs of the disadvantaged households. The
objective of NGOs’ non-formal schools is to provide education to the poorest children
who did not attend or have dropped out of formal schools.
Primary education in Bangladesh is 5 years in length, starting at age 6. There are
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11 types of primary schools.11 Currently, around 1.4 million children, or 8 percent
of children enrolled in primary schools, are in NGO-run schools. Around two-thirds
are enrolled in government schools, and another 20 percent in registered privately
managed schools. For other types of schools, the percentage of children attending
each type is 2% or smaller. As Figure 1 shows, NGO schools are relatively new. The
majority of NGO schools in the rural areas were set up after 1992. For the urban
areas, most NGO schools were established after 1995. In the case of government
schools, most were established before 1990, with only 2 out of 354 schools under the
survey established after 1990.
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is the single largest
NGO in non-formal primary education with over 30,000 non-formal primary schools.
BRAC started the Non-Formal Primary Education (NFPE) in 1985 in response to
demands from parents whose children did not have a chance to go to school. After
2 years BRAC developed a model of non-formal schools which has become highly
successful.12
This unique characteristic of having one large NGO in education makes it possible
to compare how NGO and state schools function, which is usually not possible since
NGOs in education are heterogeneous in most other countries.13 Using nationally
representative data from the 1998 Education Watch Project, this paper examines how
the expansion of NGO schools aﬀects the educational outcomes of girls, and which
characteristics of NGO and state schools matter for those outcomes.
Table 1 gives means and standard deviations of the main variables.14 Panel A
shows individual level means of boys and girls aged 6 to 10 years old for all Bangladesh,
and separately for rural and urban areas. The enrollment rate of girls has surpassed
that of boys for all Bangladesh and the rural areas. Girls’ enrollment rate has
increased significantly in recent years.15 The table also shows diﬀerences between
rural and urban areas in certain family characteristics, such as parental education
11These are: government schools, registered privately managed schools, unregistered privately
managed schools, primary schools attached to high schools, PTI’s experimental schools, indepen-
dent religious schools, religious schools attached to high madrassas, kindergarten, satellite schools,
community schools, and NGO schools (World Bank, 2000).
12When BRAC started non-formal schools, the objective was to provide basic education to chil-
dren, and continuation into the fourth grade in the formal system was not expected. However,
out of over 1.67 million students who have graduated from BRAC schools, 90% have gone on to
government schools. Nath et al. (1999) find that graduates of BRAC schools have a high level of
basic competency compared to other types of schools.
13See, for example, Miguel and Kremer (2003).
14Details on the Education Watch data are contained in the Data Appendix.
15The increase in girls’ enrollment rate is believed to have been brought about by a number of
‘positive discriminatory’ actions taken by the state and NGOs in favor of girls and poor children in
the rural areas. Among these are: (i) non-formal primary education; (ii) Female Stipend program,
where the state provides stipends to girls in secondary school and does not charge any tuition; and
(iii) Food for Education program, where the state provides a food ration to children from rural
poorer families for attending school (Chowdhury et al., 2001).
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and household economic status. Despite having parents who have less education,
girls in rural areas are more likely to be enrolled overall than urban girls and more
likely to be enrolled than rural boys.
The expansion of NGO schools into a village is captured by ‘the involvement of
NGO schools in a village’, defined as the percentage of children aged 6 to 10 years
old enrolled in NGO schools among children aged 6 to 10 years old enrolled in school
in each village. ‘The involvement of government schools’ is similarly defined. Panel
B gives village level means of ‘the involvement of NGO schools’ and ‘the involvement
of government schools’.
In general NGOs target villages with low enrollment rates. NGO schools are
usually built in villages where there is demand for the school, i.e. villages with many
dropout and non-enrolled children. For BRAC, in villages where BRAC has its
development activities, a survey is conducted to find out the number of children who
are non-enrolled or have dropped out of school, and one school is open for 33 children.
Panel C gives the school level means of the characteristics of NGO schools and
government schools. The diﬀerences between the two types of schools can be seen
in many areas. For class size, NGO schools have much smaller class size, on average
around 30 students in one class16, while government schools’ average class size is
55. Teacher absenteeism appears higher in the case of government schools; the
percentage of teachers present on the day of school visit is 97% for NGO schools and
86% for government schools. The percentage of female teachers is much higher for
NGO schools, 92% compared to 35% in the case of government schools. Teachers’
education is on average lower in the case of NGO schools. Government school teachers
have on average almost 12 years of education, compared to 10 years for NGO school
teachers.17 NGO school teachers also have much fewer years of experience, on average
2.65 years compared to almost 20 years for government school teachers.
4 Empirical Analysis
To answer the question of how the entry of NGO schools aﬀects girls’ educational
outcomes, I start by analysing how NGO schools aﬀect girls’ enrollment. For children
aged 11 to 20 years old, I find out how exposure to NGO schools aﬀects the probability
of having been enrolled, and whether the eﬀect diﬀers between boys and girls. I also
study whether, for primary school aged children, being in a village with at least one
NGO school, or a village with higher NGO school involvement, aﬀects girls’ enrollment
as compared to boys. Next I find out the characteristics of NGO and state schools
which aﬀect female participation in education. Finally, I investigate the quality of
NGO schools by analysing the learning outcomes of boys and girls attending NGO
16For BRAC schools, class size is set at 33 children for each school, which is usually a one-room
construction with one teacher.
17BRAC has a policy of hiring female teachers who have completed 9 or more years of school.
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and state schools.
Table 2 gives an overview of how the entry of NGO schools aﬀects girls’ enrollment.
I show the percentage of children with no schooling in villages with at least one NGO
school and villages with no NGO school. I focus on two age groups, 17 to 20 and
11 to 14, as most 17 to 20 year olds were not exposed to NGO schools while children
in the 11 - 14 year range were.18 Comparing columns (1) and (4), it appears that
NGO schools entered villages with a higher percentage of children with no schooling.
This is in line with the targeting policy of NGOs, where more schools are built in
villages with demand for the schools, i.e. villages with many dropout or non-enrolled
children. Columns (2) and (5) show that, for 11 to 14 years old children, girls in
villages with at least one NGO school do better than girls in villages with no NGO
school. For boys, however, the opposite is true. Columns (3) and (6) show that the
reduction in the percentage of children with no schooling has been fastest for girls in
villages with at least one NGO school. In fact, from being the worst-oﬀ group before
NGO schools entered, they became the group with the highest percentage of children
having been enrolled. This issue is further explored in the following analysis.
As Table 2 shows, NGOs appear to enter villages with low initial enrollment.
Table 3 confirms NGOs’ targeting policy. NGO school involvement is greater in
villages where adults have lower average schooling, as defined by (i) average class
passed for adults 21 years and above, and (ii) percentage of adults 21 years and
above with no schooling.19 As NGO school placement is a function of the initial level
of education in the village, there is a possible endogeneity problem where the results
found are due to the targeting policy of NGOs and not the activities of NGO schools.
To deal with this possible endogeity problem, I control for village fixed eﬀects when
analyzing children aged 11 to 20 years old. This is possible because for each village I
can divide the children into those who were exposed to NGO schools and those who
were not, using year of birth and year of NGO school establishment. In interpreting
the results, the identification assumption is that there is no omitted time-varying and
region specific eﬀects correlated with the placement of NGO schools. When analyzing
children aged 6 to 10 years old, I control for several village characteristics.20 Results
showing similar patterns emerge from analyzing 11 to 20 years old and 6 to 10 years
old, suggesting that under the assumption that there is no time-varying component
the results found are not driven by NGO school placement.
18As Figure 1 shows, most NGO schools started on or after 1992. Children aged 17 to 20 in
1998 were 11 or older in 1992, thus most of them were not exposed to NGO schools as NGO schools
usually enrol children aged 8 to 10 years old.
19In Table 3, the dependent variable is the involvement of NGO schools in a village, and explana-
tory variables are village characteristics as listed. The education of adults 21 years and above is
not aﬀected by whether there is an NGO school in the village, as those 21 years and above in 1998
would be 11 years or older in 1988, and in 1988 there were hardly any NGO schools at all (as shown
in Figure 1).
20As all children aged 6 to 10 years old are exposed to NGO schools, it is not possible to control
for village fixed eﬀects.
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4.1 Entry of NGO Schools and Girls’ Enrollment
A. Basic Results
First I explore the key question of this paper - does the entry of NGO schools con-
tribute to the increase in girls’ enrollment as compared to boys?
To find out whether being exposed to NGO schools has diﬀerent eﬀects on the
enrollment status of girls as compared to boys, I estimate the following equation:
Pr(Sij = 1) = α0 + α1EXPij + α2Girl ∗EXPij + α3Cij + α4Girl ∗ Cij
+ α5Girl + α6Vj + error term (4)
where Sij is equal to 1 if individual i in village j has been enrolled in school, and
0 otherwise. Here I focus on the age range of 11 to 20, as this age range includes
children who were exposed to NGO schools as well as those who were not. EXPij
is equal to 1 if individual i in village j has been exposed to an NGO school in the
village, and 0 otherwise. An individual is considered exposed to an NGO school if
he/she was 10 years old or younger when the first NGO school in the village was
established, as most NGO schools enrol 8 to 10 years old children.21 Girl is the
dummy variable for being a girl. I control for a number of individual and family
characteristics, represented by vector Cij, and village fixed eﬀects, Vj. Equation (4)
is estimated by maximum likelihood logit. In this specification, and all others that
follow, standard errors are clustered at the village level.22
I control for the following child and family characteristics to account for unob-
served heterogeneity that might drive enrollment: age of the child, number of adults
in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether
the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education,
household’s self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit,
whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least
one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4 show that being exposed to NGO schools increases
the probability of having been enrolled for girls as compared to boys. Interaction
terms with Girl are not included in column (1), and are included in column (2).
Column (1) shows that, compared to those who were not exposed to NGO schools,
being exposed to NGO schools increases the probability of having been enrolled for
all children. In column (2), the interaction term ‘Girl*Exposed to NGO school’
is positive and strongly significant, while the level term ‘Exposed to NGO school’
becomes insignificant. This suggests that compared to children who were not exposed
to NGO schools in the village, being exposed to NGO schools increases the probability
21I constructed this variable using the age of an individual and the year when the first NGO school
was established in the village of residence.
22See Deaton (1997).
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of having been enrolled for girls as compared to boys. The marginal eﬀect suggests
that being exposed to NGO schools increases girls’ probability of having been enrolled
by 3% compared to boys.
Columns (3) and (4) look at children who were exposed to NGO schools and
those who were not. I split the sample in this way to allow for child and family
characteristics to have diﬀerent eﬀects on children who were exposed to NGO schools
and whose who were not.23 For the group of children who were exposed to NGO
schools, girls are more likely to be enrolled compared to boys, controlling for other
factors. The coeﬃcient of ‘Girl’ is positive and strongly significant in column (3).
On the other hand, for children who were not exposed to NGO schools, the coeﬃcient
of ‘Girl’ is marginal and insignificant.
Taken together, the results suggest that being exposed to NGO schools in the
village significantly increases the probability of having been enrolled for girls as com-
pared to boys.
Next I investigate whether the exposure to NGO schools leads to an increase in
class passed, defined as the last class which a child has completed, and whether the
eﬀects are stronger for girls as compared to boys. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 show
the results from estimating equation (4) using the last class passed as the dependent
variable. The results are similar to those in the case of enrollment: being exposed
to NGO schools increases class passed for all children, and the eﬀect operates mainly
through girls. The marginal eﬀect suggests that being exposed to NGO schools
increases class passed for girls by 0.23 year as compared to boys.
Columns (7) and (8) report the results from splitting the sample into those who
were exposed to NGO schools and those who were not. For the group of children who
were exposed to NGO schools, girls appear to have significantly higher class passed
compared to boys. The coeﬃcient of ‘Girl’ is positive and significant at the 1% level.
For children who were not exposed to NGO schools, the coeﬃcient of ‘Girl’ is much
smaller in magnitude and less strongly significant24 compared to the case of children
who were exposed to NGO schools.
Taken together, the results suggest that the entry of NGO schools increases girls’
enrollment and class passed compared to boys.
Table 5 shows the results from using a diﬀerent identification strategy, where I
analyze how the intensity of NGO schools in the village aﬀects enrollment and class
passed of children born in diﬀerent years.25 The year of birth and the village of birth
jointly determine an individual’s exposure to NGO schools. As Figure 1 shows, over
95% of NGO schools were established in or after 1992. Since NGO schools usually
23It is possible that for children who were exposed to NGO schools, parents may become more
sensitive towards girls’ needs for education due to NGO activities in the village of residence.
24For children who were not exposed to NGO schools, the coeﬃcient of ‘Girl’ is significant at 10%
level.
25The intensity of NGO schools in a village is measured by the number of NGO schools in the
village per 100 children aged 11 to 20 years old.
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enrol children aged 8 to 10 years old, those who were 11 or older in 1992 were not
exposed to NGO schools. At the time of the survey in 1998, children who were 17
years or older form the cohort who were too old to benefit from NGO schools. I
compare the eﬀects of the intensity of NGO schools in the village of residence on
children who were young enough to be exposed to the schools versus those who were
too old to benefit from them. If exposure to NGO schools increases class passed
rates for children, we would expect to find no eﬀect for those 17 years or older, and
increasing eﬀects for younger children.26
I estimate the following equation:
Yijk = α0 + α1NPj ∗ Tik + α2Tik + α3Cijk + α4Vj + error term (5)
where Yijk is (i) whether individual i in village j who is of age k has ever been
enrolled27, and (ii) the last class passed for individual i in village j who is of age k,
where 11 ≤ k ≤ 20. NPj is the number of NGO schools in village j per 100 children
aged 11 to 20 years old. Tik is the treatment dummy indicating the age of individual
i. Cijk denotes child and family characteristics of individual i in village j who is of
age k.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show that exposure to NGO schools has positive
eﬀects on the probability of having been enrolled for girls. The coeﬃcients of ‘Number
NGO schools*age k’ are positive and significant for girls aged 12 to 15, and positive
though insignificant at the 10% level for boys of the same age range. For both boys
and girls, there appears to be little or no eﬀect on those aged 17 and above. Here
age 20 is the omitted category. The results show that NGO schools increase the
probability of having been enrolled for children who were exposed to the schools,
with stronger eﬀects in the case of girls. Results regarding class passed, as shown
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, are similar to those regarding enrollment. The
coeﬃcients of ‘Number NGO schools*age k’ are positive and significant for girls aged
15 and below, and positive though mostly insignificant at the 10% level for boys of
the same age range.
Overall, the results in Table 5 point to the same direction as those in Table 4:
NGO schools appear to increase girls’ enrollment and class passed as compared to
boys.
Next I look at whether being in a village with an NGO school increases the
probability of being enrolled for children aged 6 to 10 years old. While studying
the enrollment history of children 11 to 20 years old has the advantage of comparing
between those who were exposed to NGO schools versus those who were not, focusing
on 6 to 10 years old, the primary school age in Bangladesh, allows for the analysis of
the current primary enrollment situation in Bangladesh.
26This is the same identification strategy as in Duflo (2001).
27The variable is equal to 1 if the individual has ever been enrolled and 0 otherwise.
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I estimate the following equation:
Pr(Sij = 1) = α0 + α1Nij + α2Girl ∗Nij + α3Gij + α4Girl ∗Gij + α5Cij
+ α6Girl ∗ Cij + α7Girl + α8Aj + α9V cj + error term (6)
where Nij represents two diﬀerent measures of supply of NGO schools in village j.
One is whether there is at least 1 NGO school in village j , and the other is the
involvement of NGO schools in village j. ‘The involvement of NGO schools in a
village’ is defined as the percentage of children aged 6 to 10 years old enrolled in
NGO schools among children aged 6 to 10 years old enrolled in school in each village,
excluding the child from the sample. This variable shows the relative importance
of NGO schools in a village. Gij is similarly defined for government schools.28 Aj
represents the stratum in which village j is located, and V cj is a vector of village-
level characteristics. Village characteristics included are percentage of adults with
no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic
status, percentage of landless households, percentage of households with members
who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households,
and percentage of Muslims in the village. All other variables are as defined above.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 6 show the main findings. In column (2), the in-
teraction term ‘Girl*At least 1 NGO school’ is positive and significant at the 1%
level, indicating that being in villages with at least 1 NGO school is associated with
higher probability of being enrolled for girls as compared to boys. The marginal
eﬀect suggests that the magnitude of this eﬀect is 3%, which is similar to the case of
11 to 20 years old. The interaction term ‘Girl*Fraction NGO’ in column (4) is also
positive and significant at the 10% level. Both results point to the same direction
that NGO schools increase girls’ enrollment as compared to boys. On the other hand,
having at least 1 government school in the village or having more government school
involvement does not show diﬀerent eﬀects on the probability of being enrolled for
girls as compared to boys. This suggests that it is exposure to NGO schools and not
government schools that drives up girls’ enrollment relative to boys.
Column (3) shows that NGO school involvement is associated with lower proba-
bility of being enrolled for all children. As Tables 2 and 3 suggest, NGOs appear to
target villages with low enrollment rates.
To conclude, the results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 point to the role of NGO schools in
increasing girls’ enrollment. Being exposed to NGO schools significantly increases
enrollment and class passed for girls as compared to boys. Moreover, living in a village
with at least one NGO school, or a village with higher NGO school involvement, is
associated with higher enrollment for girls as compared to boys.29
28As there are 11 types of primary schools in Bangladesh, the involvement of NGO schools and
the involvement of government schools in a village do not add up to one.
29Appendix 2, Table 12 shows the eﬀects of child and family characteristics on the probability of
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B. Extensions
Results in the previous subsection lead to the conclusion that NGO schools have
contributed to the increase in female enrollment in Bangladesh. However, given the
characteristics of NGO schools which aim to suit the needs of the poorest children,
it is possible that NGO schools may increase female enrollment for some groups (e.g.
rural versus urban, BRAC target versus non-target households) and not others. Also,
to draw out policy implications it is useful to find out how NGO schools aﬀect female
enrollment for diﬀerent groups of the population.
Here I analyze whether the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment
vary between rural and urban areas, and between BRAC target and non-target house-
holds. The rural and urban areas in Bangladesh diﬀer in many aspects which possibly
impact how NGO schools aﬀect female enrollment. For example, in the urban areas
schools are more likely to be closer and there are more infrastructures such as roads.
In the case of BRAC target and non-target households, when BRAC started its
NGO schools the main objective was to provide education to children from BRAC
target households, defined as households with less than 0.5 acre of land and at least
1 person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a year (Nath, 1999). How-
ever, as there were many children from non-target households who did not have an
education, BRAC schools also enrol children from non-target households. BRAC
target households are the poorest group of the population, and whether NGO schools
aﬀect target and non-target groups diﬀerently should provide insights into how NGO
schools aﬀect female enrollment.
Panel A in Table 7 shows the results from estimating equation (4) separately
for rural and urban areas, while Panels B and C show the results from estimating
equation (6) for rural and urban areas. Columns (1) and (2) show that, for children
aged 11 to 20 years old, the eﬀect of being exposed to NGO schools on relative female
enrollment can be found in both rural and urban areas, with the eﬀect being stronger
for the rural areas. Panels B and C show that the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing
girls’ enrollment as compared to boys are found mainly in the rural areas. For Panel
B, the coeﬃcient of ‘Girl*At least 1 NGO school’ is positive and significant only for
the rural areas. For Panel C, the coeﬃcient of ‘Girl*Fraction NGO’ is positive and
significant for the rural areas, and insignificant for the urban areas.
One possible reason NGO schools seem to increase relative female enrollment
mainly in the rural areas is that in rural villages government schools and other types
of schools are likely to be far away, therefore having an NGO school in the village
would encourage parents to send the girls to school. As the theory suggested, the
disutility associated with sending a girl to school could be reduced by having NGO
being enrolled for boys and girls. Most of the child and family characteristics have the expected sign,
although there are some exceptions. In line with Figure 2C, being from a household which reports
their economic status as ‘surplus’ has a negative and significant relationship with the probability of
being enrolled for girls in the urban areas.
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schools nearby to children’s homes. Moreover, in many cases the poorest children
in urban areas who attend NGO schools are children of construction workers who
often have to move from site to site, making it diﬃcult for the children to continue
in school.30
Table 8 shows the results from estimating equation (6) separately for BRAC target
and non-target households. The results show that NGO schools have stronger eﬀects
in increasing relative female enrollment for BRAC target households as compared
to non-target households.31 The coeﬃcients of ‘Girl*At least 1 NGO school’ and
‘Girl*Fraction NGO’ are positive and significant in the case of target households.
The eﬀects on non-target households are positive though not statistically significant
at the 10% level. The results suggest that the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing
relative female enrollment is stronger for BRAC target households, although there is
evidence of some eﬀects in the case of non-target households as well. This is in line
with the fact that NGO schools also enrol children from non-target households.
In summary, it appears that NGO schools increase relative female enrollment
mainly in the rural areas. Moreover, the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing
relative female enrollment are stronger for BRAC target households compared to
non-target households.32 These results make us more confident that the increase in
female versus male primary school enrollment is being driven by exposure of poor
rural households (and in particular BRAC target households) to NGO schools.
C. Robustness Checks
Restricting to BRAC schools
The largest NGO in non-formal primary education is the Bangladesh Rural Advance-
ment Committee (BRAC). The school data from the Education Watch Project shows
that 73% of NGO schools are BRAC schools. Many smaller NGOs also follow the
BRAC model in setting up and managing their schools.33 For a robustness check of
whether the previous findings are driven by BRAC schools, here I restrict the analysis
to BRAC schools only.
Table 9 shows that the main results regarding BRAC schools are very similar to
those in the case of all NGO schools. Columns (1) to (6) show that, for children 6 to 10
years old, BRAC school involvement is significantly associated with higher probability
30I thank BRAC personnel who suggested this possibility.
31As the criteria of land-owning is relevant only for the rural areas, the analysis focuses on BRAC
target and non-target households in the rural areas.
32As the condition of having ‘at least 1 person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a
year’ may change each year, I also looked at the criterial of land-owning only. The results show
that the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing relative female enrollment are positive and significant
for households owning less than 0.5 acre of land and insignificant for households owning more than
0.5 acre of land.
33BRAC’s Education Support Programme provides support in the areas of technical, conceptual
and human skills to 303 NGOs for 2,505 schools.
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of being enrolled for girls as compared to boys, moreover, the eﬀect is found mainly
in the rural areas and the eﬀects are stronger for BRAC target households compared
to non-target households.34 These results are very similar to those found in the
case of all NGO schools, and suggest that BRAC schools play an important role in
increasing girls’ enrollment in Bangladesh and that the BRAC model of non-formal
primary education contains certain characteristics which encourage girls’ enrollment.
4.2 What School Characteristics Determine Female Partici-
pation in Education?
The previous section has shown that NGO schools contribute to an increase in female
enrollment. The objective of this section is to uncover the mechanisms through which
NGO schools aﬀect female participation in education.
To find out the characteristics of NGO and government schools in the village of
residence which aﬀect enrollment, I estimate the equation:
Pr(Sij = 1) = α0 + α1Ncj + α2Gcj + α3Cij + α4Aj + α5V cj + error term (7)
where Ncj is a vector of aggregate village-level characteristics of NGO schools in
village j, and Gcj is a vector of aggregate village-level characteristics of government
schools in village j. All other variables are as defined above. Here the analysis
is restricted to villages with at least one NGO school, therefore the sample size is
smaller compared to the previous section.
Interaction terms with Girl are included in the next equation to find out the
diﬀerent eﬀects that village-level school characteristics have on the probability of
being enrolled for girls as compared to boys.
Pr(Sij = 1) = α0 + α1Ncj + α2Girl ∗Ncj + α3Gcj + α4Girl ∗Gcj + α5Cij
+ α6Girl ∗ Cij + α7Girl + α8Aj + α9V cj + error term (8)
The results are reported in Table 10. Column (1) shows that the most prominent
NGO school characteristic which appears to encourage enrollment for all children is
the high percentage of female teachers. The percentage of female teachers in NGO
schools also appears to increase girls’ enrollment as compared to boys, the coeﬃcient
of ‘percentage of female teachers in NGO schools*Girl’ is positive and significant at
the 5% level. For NGO schools, having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) also
seems to encourage enrollment for all children.
For government schools, larger class size appears to discourage enrollment, and
the eﬀects appear similar for boys and girls. Having government school teachers with
34Similar results are found using ‘whether there is at least 1 BRAC school’ instead of ‘BRAC
school involvement’.
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more experience seems to encourage girls’ enrollment, although there is no significant
eﬀect in the case of boys. Having School Management Committees (SMCs), on the
other hand, appears to encourage boys’ enrollment with no eﬀect in the case of girls.
Overall, the results suggest that high percentage of female teachers and having
PTAs are important NGO school characteristics which encourage enrollment for both
boys and girls. In particular, high percentage of female teachers appears to be the
most prominent NGO school characteristic which encourages girls’ enrollment.35
4.3 How do NGO Schools Aﬀect Learning Outcomes?
The impact of NGO schools on welfare depends not only on enrollment, but also on
how the students are learning as a result of attending NGO schools. In this section
I further investigate the quality of NGO schools using test score data. NGO schools
use a diﬀerent model of teaching compared to state schools, and there is no obvious
reason why NGO school students should perform better or worse compared to those
attending state schools.
Under the Assessment of Basic Competencies (ABC) survey, in each village 7
boys and 7 girls aged 11-12 years old were randomly selected to take the ABC test.36
Using this sample, I estimate the following equation:
Yij = α0 + α1Tij + α2Girl ∗ Tij + α3Cij + α4Girl ∗ Cij + α5Vj
+ error term (9)
where Yij represents (i) whether a child passed the ABC test or not, and (ii) test scores
of life-skills, reading, writing, and numeracy sections. Tij is the dummy variable for
the type of school that the child was attending at the time of suvey. I control for
children who have dropped out of school, and the omitted category is the group who
have never been enrolled. Other variables are as defined above.
A child is considered to have ‘basic education’, i.e. to pass the ABC test, if
he/she satisfied the following criteria: (i) answering correctly at least 7 out of 10 life
skills questions; (ii) answering correctly at least 3 of the 4 questions from the reading
comprehension passage; (iii) correctly communicating a given message through a
letter; and (iv) answering correctly at least 3 of the 4 mental arithmetic questions
(Chowdhury et al., 1999).
35As shown in Table 1, attendance rate is much higher in NGO schools compared to government
schools (85% versus 55%). OLS regressions with attendance rate as dependent variable and school
characteristics and school type dummies as explanatory variables show that the determinants of
attendance are similar for boys and girls (results not shown). The single most important determinant
of attendance is the percentage of teachers present on the day of school visit. Teacher absenteeism
therefore appears to discourage attendance of both boys and girls. Teacher absenteeism is also quite
common and is a major concern in other developing countries such as India (The PROBE team,
1999).
36The Data Appendix contains detail on the ABC test.
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Table 11 shows that, for both boys and girls, attending an NGO school has positive
and significant eﬀects on the probability of passing the ABC test, and all test scores.
Attending an NGO school also significantly increases the probability of passing the
ABC test for girls as compared to boys. For each section’s test scores, however, the
eﬀects do not diﬀer between boys and girls.
Attending a government school appears to significantly increase the probability of
passing the ABC test for girls, although there seems to be no eﬀect for boys. For all
children, attending a government school significantly increases reading and writing
scores. The eﬀect on numeracy section is positive though not significant, and there
appears to be no eﬀect on life skills section.37 For each section, the eﬀect of attending
a government school do not diﬀer between boys and girls.
The eﬀects of attending an NGO school on test scores are larger than the eﬀects of
attending a government school. For reading skills38, compared to children who have
never been enrolled, attending an NGO school increases the scores of reading skills
by 21% for boys and 22% for girls. For government schools, the corresponding eﬀects
are 9% and 8% respectively. For writing skills39, attending an NGO school increases
the scores by 26% for boys and 31% for girls, while the corresponding eﬀects are 10%
for both boys and girls in the case of government schools. Attending a government
school does not show significant eﬀects in improving scores for the life skills and
numeracy skills sections.
The strongest determinant of test scores for all sections is the last class passed.
Listening to the radio, watching television, and reading newspaper are positively
associated with the scores of life skills section. Listening to the radio and reading
newspaper also significantly increase the probability of passing the ABC test. Most
factors related to household economic status do not significantly aﬀect children’s test
scores. Most of the determinants of test scores appear similar for boys and girls.40
Results from Table 11 suggest that, controlling for other factors, attending an
NGO school shows stronger eﬀects in improving children’s test scores compared to
attending a government school. For children who took the ABC test, those in
NGO schools would have been in school for a shorter period of time compared to
their peers in government schools, since NGO schools enrol children 8-10 years old
while government schools enrol children 6 years or above. Moreover, NGO school
students are mainly those from the poorest families who were non-enrolled or have
dropped out of school. As NGO schools use a diﬀerent model of teaching, including a
37The diﬀerent eﬀects of NGO schools and government schools on life skills section could be due
to the curriculum. NGO schools emphasize more on matters such as health and personal hygiene,
which are tested in the life skills section.
38There are 4 questions for reading skills section.
39The full score for writing skills section is 9.
40The most notable exception is that being from economically well-oﬀ families has a positive and
significant relationship with the reading and writing scores for girls compared to boys. In fact,
being from well-oﬀ families appears to have a negative eﬀect on reading and writing scores for boys,
a rather surprising result.
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child-centered approach, simple textbooks which are relevant to rural life, continuous
evaluation instead of exams, and flexible class times, the strong eﬀect of NGO schools
on test scores is very likely the result of the NGO model of teaching.
Overall, the results indicate that NGO schools significantly improve children’s
competencies in all areas tested by the ABC test. Moreover, attending an NGO
school significantly increases the probability of passing the ABC test for girls as
compared to boys. The eﬀects, however, do not appear to diﬀer between boys and
girls for each section’s test scores.
5 Conclusions
Bangladesh has achieved gender parity in primary enrollment in spite of being one
of the poorest countries in the world. More surprisingly, it is among the poorest
households in the rural areas where net enrollment rate of girls is most notably higher
than that of boys. This is contrary to the situation in other low income countries.
For Bangladesh, the entry of NGOs in primary education appears to be an important
part of the success story. NGOs in Bangladesh are heavily involved in the provision
of primary education, in particular to the poorest children.
Understanding what factors led to gender parity in primary enrollment is a key
issue which has important policy implications. In this paper I identify the eﬀects of
NGO schools on girls’ enrollment and examine the characteristics which account for
the relative performance of NGO versus state schools in improving girls’ educational
outcomes.
The results show that the entry of NGO schools has significantly increased girls’
enrollment as compared to boys. For children aged 11 to 20 years old, being exposed
to NGO schools significantly increases the probability of having been enrolled for girls
as compared to boys. Moreover, for children aged 6 to 10 years old, living in a village
with at least one NGO school or a village with higher NGO school involvement is
associated with higher enrollment for girls as compared to boys. When divided into
rural and urban areas, the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment are
found mainly in the rural areas, where circumstances are likely to allow NGO schools
to function well. Moreover, the eﬀects of NGO schools in increasing girls’ enrollment
are stronger for BRAC target households, the original target group of NGO schools,
compared to non-target households. The two most prominent characteristics of NGO
schools that encourage girls’ enrollment are the high percentage of female teachers
and having Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs). NGO schools also show strong
eﬀects in improving children’s test scores.
The innovative ways of NGO schools and the resulting increase in girls’ enroll-
ment show what can be achieved when policies are designed to suit the needs of the
poor. In this paper I have identified some characteristics of NGO schools which af-
fect educational outcomes. However, certain characteristics that are believed to have
contributed to the success of NGO schools are those related to pedagogy practices
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and motivation. Such characteristics are diﬃcult to capture in quantitative data.
How dancing and singing are part of the curriculum and how NGO school teachers
actually visited houses to convince parents to send their children to school are only
some examples. There are other aspects of NGO schools that are beyond the scope
of this paper.
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6 Data Appendix
The data used in this study came from the Education Watch Project. The Educa-
tion Watch project was initiated in 1998 by the Campaign for Popular Education
(CAMPE), a coalition of more than 400 NGOs involved in non-formal primary edu-
cation, together with concerned individuals and organizations. The project aims to
create more transparency in the education system in Bangladesh by collecting and
providing accurate information relating to education, particularly primary education.
CAMPE provided the secretariat for the project, while the Research and Evaluation
Division of BRAC carried out the actual management and execution of the study.
Three rounds of data have been collected; the first round in 1998, and the second and
third rounds in 2000. Each round of data contains information on certain aspects of
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education in Bangladesh. This paper uses the first round of data, which focuses on
the internal eﬃciency41 of primary education system in Bangladesh.
The survey was conducted during October and November 1998, and data from
42,584 households and 885 schools in 240 clusters covering all 64 districts in Bangladesh
was collected. Out of 240 villages under the survey, 81 villages have at least 1 NGO
school.
Three survey instruments were used to collect the data:
(1.) Household Survey Questionnaire (42,584 households from 312 villages in all
64 districts with 31,092 children). This questionnaire has 4 sections: profile of each
household member, schooling of the members aged 4-20 years, parental information,
and household level information.
(2.) Assessment of Basic Competencies (ABC) Questionnaire (3,360 children: 7
boys and 7 girls from each of the 240 clusters). This part of the survey is intended to
provide information on the level of basic competencies of the children as an indicator
of achievement. There are four sections: life skills/knowledge, reading, writing, and
numeracy.
A child is considered to have ‘basic education’ if he/she satisfied the following
criteria: (i) answering correctly at least seven of the ten life skills questions; (ii) an-
swering correctly at least three of the four questions from the reading comprehension
passage; (iii) correctly communicating a given message through a letter; and (iv)
answering correctly at least three of the four mental arithmetic questions.
(3.) School Observation Checklist (885 schools). There are seven sections in the
checklist: general information about the school, classroom information, teachers’ pro-
file, community participation, retention and dropout, school visit by the supervisors,
and losses due to the flood of 1998.
The sampling procedure was designed in such a way that the data is nation-
ally representative. Because of variations in educational attainment in diﬀerent
geographical regions in Bangladesh, eight diﬀerent surveys were carried out in each
strata. The strata considered were six rural divisions, the metropolitan cities and the
non-metropolitan urban areas.42 For each stratum the same sample size and similar
sampling strategy were followed. Employing a multi-stage sampling procedure, at
the first stage, for each stratum 30 thanas (pourashava for non-metropolitan urban
areas) were selected through systematic random sampling technique with probability
proportional to size (PPS). At the second stage, one union (or ward for the urban
strata) for each selected thana/pourashava was selected randomly. At the third
stage, one village (mahala for the urban strata) was selected, again randomly, for
41In education literature two types of eﬃciencies are identified: external and internal. External
eﬃciency refers to broader social goals such as better health and productive person-power for the
labour market, while internal eﬃciency refers to objectives which are internal to the education
system such as enrollment and achievement (Chowdhury et al., 1999).
42The six rural divisions are rural Dhaka, rural Chittagong, rural Rajshahi, rural Khulna, rural
Barisal, and rural Sylhet, while the metropolitan cities and the non-metropolitan urban areas are
located throughout the country.
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each selected union/ward. In other words, 30 villages/mahalla were selected for each
stratum, totalling 240 for the whole of Bangladesh. It came out that all 64 districts
of the country were represented in the sample.
For each village/mahalla, the number of households interviewed varied between
125 and 200, depending on the size of the village/mahalla. The interviewers started in
the north-west corner of the village/mahalla, and surveyed the first household of the
corner, and then moved anti-clockwise for the next household, and continued doing so.
If the village/mahalla was small, and the number of households did not reach 125, then
the interviewers moved to the closest village/mahallah and completed the interview.
If there were more than 200 households in the village/mahallah, then the survey
stopped at reaching the 200th household. For each village/mahallah, 14 children (7
boys and 7 girls) aged 11-12 years, chosen randomly from the surveyed households,
were interviewed for the ABC survey. For the school survey, all schools located in the
selected village/mahallah and its adjacent village/mahallah were surveyed through
the School Observation Checklist.
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  TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES 
 
    
Panel A: Individual Level Means* All Bangladesh Rural Urban 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Enrollment rate  .766 .791 .760 .793 .793 .784 
 (.42) (.41) (.43) (.41) (.41) (.41) 
Number of adults in household 2.59 2.59 2.57 2.57 2.67 2.66 
 (1.37) (1.36) (1.31) (1.34) (1.56) (1.45) 
Number of siblings  3.83 3.90 3.92 4.00 3.51 3.50 
 (1.72) (1.69) (1.72) (1.70) (1.68) (1.58) 
Proportion of boys among siblings .67 .36 .66 .37 .68 .32 
 (.23) (.23) (.23) (.22) (.24) (.24) 
Proportion of female headed households .030 .030 .032 .032 .024 .026 
 (.17) (.17) (.18) (.18) (.15) (.16) 
Father’s education (class passed) 3.13 3.18 2.64 2.70 5.04 4.95 
 (4.22) (4.25) (3.77) (3.82) (5.19) (5.17) 
Mother’s education (class passed) 1.99 2.00 1.58 1.62 3.57 3.41 
 (3.19) (3.17) (2.68) (2.72) (4.31) (4.17) 
Proportion of households ‘always in deficit’  .33 .32 .35 .34 .24 .23 
 (.47) (.47) (.48) (.48) (.43) (.42) 
Proportion of households ‘sometimes in deficit’  .33 .34 .35 .36 .29 .29 
 (.47) (.48) (.48) (.48) (.45) (.45) 
Proportion of households economically ‘balance’ .24 .24 .22 .22 .33 .32 
 (.43) (.43) (.41) (.41) (.47) (.47) 
Proportion of  households economically ‘surplus’ .09 .10 .08 .08 .15 .16 
 (.29) (.30) (.27) (.27) (.36) (.37) 
Proportion of households: mother access to NGO  .18 .18 .19 .19 .12 .13 
credit (.38) (.38) (.39) (.39) (.33) (.33) 
Proportion of household: mother involved in  .25 .25 .27 .26 .19 .21 
income generating activities (.43) (.43) (.44) (.44) (.39) (.41) 
Proportion of households: member sells labor at  .48 .48 .51 .52 .37 .35 
least 100 days/year (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.48) (.48) 
Number of observations 15846 15187 12568 11965 3278 3222 
    
Panel B: Village Level Means           All Bangladesh              Rural Urban 
Involvement of NGO schools  .07 .066 .084 
 (.13) (.13) (.15) 
Involvement of government schools  .61 .65 .49 
 (.29) (.30) (.24) 
Number of observations 240 180 60 
    
Panel C: School Level Means           NGO schools      Gov. schools 
Class size  29.8 55.3 
  (5.1) (30.7) 
Proportion of teachers present on day of visit  .97 .86 
  (.15) (.18) 
Proportion of female teachers  .92 .35 
  (.26) (.33) 
Teachers’ education (years)  10.1 11.8 
  (1.3) (1.0) 
Teachers’ experience (years)  2.65 19.5 
  (2.4) (5.7) 
Proportion of schools with PTAs  .34 .70 
  (.47) (.46) 
Proportion of schools with SMCs  .77 .99 
  (.42) (.09) 
Attendance rate  .85 .55 
  (.16) (.15) 
Number of observations  215 353 
* Individual Level Means are those of individuals aged 6-10 years old.   
Standard deviations are in parentheses.  See the Data Appendix for detail on the 1998 Education Watch Data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN WITH NO SCHOOLING  
BY COHORT AND VILLAGE OF RESIDENCE 
 
 NGO school availability in village of residence 
 At least 1 NGO school No NGO school 
 Aged 17-20 Aged 11-14 % Change  Aged 17-20 Aged 11-14 % Change 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Girls: .273 .126 -53.8  .244 .149 -38.9 
 (.44) (.33)   (.43) (.36)  
       
Boys: .234 .180 -23.1  .207 .165 -20.3 
 (.43) (.39)   (.41) (.37)  
       
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF NGO SCHOOL LOCATION 
 
Dependent variable: The involvement of NGO schools in a village 
 All Bangladesh Rural Urban 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Village characteristics:       
Average class passed (adults 21 +) -.025  -.025  -.022  
 (3.3)***  (2.3)**  (1.8)*  
% adults (21+) with no schooling  .259  .213  .399 
  (3.5)***  (2.5)**  (2.5)** 
NGO micro-credit in village .039 .053 .063 .066 -.025 -.012 
 (1.6) (2.1)** (1.9)* (2.0)** (.56) (.28) 
Average economic status .023 .007 .038 .031 .011 .022 
 (.59) (.21) (.82) (.67) (.16) (.34) 
% landless households -.003 -.006 -.034 -.045 .108 .105 
 (.05) (.09) (.48) (.63) (.81) (.81) 
% hh w/ members who sell labor .050 .045 .031 .033 .108 .051 
100 days/year + (.74) (.67) (.38) (.41) (.87) (.41) 
% female- headed households -.024 .007 -.003 .009 -.432 -.379 
 (.13) (.04) (.02) (.04) (1.0) (.91) 
% Muslims -.005 -.013 -.035 -.041 .125 .109 
 (.13) (.35) (.80) (.92) (1.5) (1.3) 
       
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 240 240 180 180 60 60 
Adjusted R-squared .14 .14 .10 .10 .25 .29 
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4
ENTRY OF NGO SCHOOLS AND GIRLS’ ENROLLMENT AND CLASS PASSED: 
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 11 TO 20 
 
 Dependent variable: Ever enrolled = 1 Dependent variable: Last class passed 
 All children Exposed Non-
exposed 
All children Exposed Non-
exposed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exposed to NGO school  .182 .004   .207 .089   
 (2.0)** (.03)   (1.7)* (.69)   
Girl*Exposed to NGO school  .385    .231   
  (2.9)***    (2.8)***   
Girl .065 -1.53 .308 .036 .102 -1.88 .290 .079 
 (1.3) (6.4)*** (2.7)*** (.70) (2.6)** (7.1)*** (3.1)*** (1.9)* 
         
Control for child and Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
family characteristics         
Village effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 43738 43738 4369 39264 43677 43677 4468 39209 
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 .254 .258 .253 .257 .449 .449 .408 .449 
For columns (1) – (4), absolute z-statistics are in parentheses.  For columns (5) – (8), absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village 
level.  Child and family characteristics include: age of the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage 
of boys among all siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s 
self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating 
activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion.  A child is 
considered ‘exposed to an NGO school’ if he/she was 10 years old or younger when the first NGO school in the village was 
established. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5
ENTRY OF NGO SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT, AND CLASS PASSED: 
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 11 TO 20 
 
 Dep Var: Ever enrolled = 1  Dep var: Last class passed 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number NGO schools*age11 .003 .093 .231 .261 
 (.03) (1.0) (1.6) (1.9)* 
   12 .130 .162 .229 .269 
 (1.4) (2.1)** (1.8)* (2.1)** 
13 .007 .177 .206 .245 
 (.08) (2.3)** (1.5) (1.7)* 
14 .049 .161 .138 .294 
 (.38) (2.2)** (.93) (2.1)** 
15 .102 .196 .194 .266 
 (1.1) (2.5)** (1.4) (2.1)** 
16 .012 .099 .088 .171 
 (.14) (1.5) (.68) (1.4) 
17 -.020 .116 .030 .138 
 (.25) (1.5) (.24) (1.1) 
18 .030 .099 .010 .109 
 (.36) (1.3) (.07) (.93) 
19 -.042 .023 -.080 -.034 
 (.41) (.20) (.46) (.19) 
     
Control for child and Yes Yes Yes Yes 
family characteristics     
Village effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 22081 21657 22052 21629 
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 .238 .304 .448 .459 
For columns (1) and (2), absolute z-statistics are in parentheses.  For columns (3) and (4), absolute t-
statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.   Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.  Child and family 
characteristics include: age of the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, 
percentage of boys among all siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, father’s 
education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access 
to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one 
member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion.  A child is considered 
‘exposed to an NGO school’ if he/she was 10 years old or younger when the first NGO school in the 
village was established.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10 
 
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school = 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
At least 1 NGO school .013 -.114   
 (.15) (1.2)   
Girl*At least 1 NGO school  .220   
  (2.6)***   
At least 1 government school .107 .089   
 (.71) (.54)   
Girl*At least 1 government school  .045   
  (.36)   
NGO school involvement   -.656 -.917 
   (1.7)* (2.2)** 
Girl*NGO school involvement    .543 
    (1.8)* 
Government school involvement   .075 -.006 
   (.47) (.04) 
Girl*Gov. school involvement    .168 
    (1.3) 
Girl .114 -.748 .114 -.680 
 (2.6)*** (2.6)*** (2.7)*** (2.3)** 
     
Control for child and family  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
characteristics     
Control for village characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 31033 31033 31033 31033 
Pseudo R2 .143 .146 .143 .146 
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.   Child and family characteristics include: age of the child, 
number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether the household is a 
female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived economic status, whether mother 
has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one member of 
the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion.  Village characteristics include percentage of adults with 
no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of landless 
households, percentage of households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed 
households, and percentage of Muslims in the village.   
 
   
 
TABLE 7
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: RURAL VERSUS URBAN AREAS 
 
 Rural versus urban 
 Dep var: Ever enrolled = 1 Dep var: Currently enrolled = 1 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL A: 11-20 years old     
Exposed to NGO school .010 -.104   
 (.08) (.58)   
Girl*Exposed to NGO school .315 .594   
 (2.2)** (1.9)*   
Girl -1.37 -2.23   
 (4.4)*** (4.1)***   
PANEL B: 6-10 years old     
Measure of supply of NGO schools (1)     
At least 1 NGO school   -.149 -.103 
   (1.4) (.51) 
Girl*At least 1 NGO    .195 .211 
school   (2.0)** (1.5) 
At least 1 gov. school   .015 .157 
   (.07) (.77) 
Girl*At least 1 gov.   -.022 .020 
school   (.13) (.14) 
Girl   -.639 -.407 
   (2.0)** (.87) 
PANEL C: 6-10 years old     
Measure of supply of NGO schools (2)     
Fraction: NGO schools   -1.02 -1.88 
   (1.9)* (2.5)** 
Girl*Fraction NGO    .796 -.086 
   (2.2)** (.22) 
Fraction: Gov. schools    -.198 -.025 
   (1.1) (.06) 
Girl*Fraction Gov.    .116 .015 
   (.85) (.06) 
Girl   -.591 -.305 
   (1.8)* (.60) 
     
Control for child and Yes Yes Yes Yes 
family characteristics     
Control for village No No Yes Yes 
characteristics     
Stratum effects No No Yes Yes 
Village effects Yes Yes No No 
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.   Child and family characteristics include: age of the child, 
number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether the household is a 
female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived economic status, whether 
mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one 
member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion.  Village characteristics include percentage 
of adults with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of 
landless households, percentage of households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female 
headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the village. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: BRAC TARGET VERSUS NON-TARGET HOUSEHOLDS 
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10 
 
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school = 1 
 BRAC target versus non-target households 
 Target Non-target Target Non-target 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
At least 1 NGO school -.138 -.181   
 (1.0) (1.7)*   
Girl*At least 1 NGO school .214 .169   
 (1.7)* (1.5)   
At least 1 government school .187 -.299   
 (.88) (1.2)   
Girl*At least 1 government school -.259 .352   
 (1.4) (1.4)   
NGO school involvement   -.737 -1.39 
   (1.1) (3.4)** 
Girl*NGO school involvement   .872 .648 
   (2.0)** (1.6) 
Government school involvement   -.029 -.364 
   (.14) (1.8) 
Girl*Gov. school involvement   .198 -.026 
   (1.1) (.14) 
Girl -.403 -.608 -.684 -.216 
 (1.0) (1.6) (1.6) (.66) 
     
Control for child and family  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
characteristics     
Control for village characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 10331 14202 10331 14202 
Pseudo R2 .107 .142 .107 .142 
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.   Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.   Child and family characteristics 
include: age of the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all 
siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s 
self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-
generating activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 
days/year, and religion.  Village characteristics include percentage of adults with no schooling, whether there is an 
NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of landless households, percentage of 
households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and 
percentage of Muslims in the village.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9
BRAC SCHOOLS AND ENROLLMENT:   
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10 
 
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled = 1 
  All Bangladesh Rural Urban Target Non-target 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fraction: BRAC schools   -1.42 -1.91 -1.80 3.34 -2.00 -1.63 
   (3.4)*** (5.1)*** (4.4)*** (4.2)*** (4.1)*** (3.7)*** 
Girl*Fraction BRAC    1.05 1.27 -.144 1.61 .836 
    (2.3)** (3.1)*** (.26) (3.1)*** (1.8)* 
Fraction: Gov. schools   .044 .037 -.234 .319 -.094 -.352 
   (.28) (.23) (1.3) (.85) (.47) (1.8)* 
Girl*Fraction Gov.    .169 .126 -.031 .211 -.021 
    (1.4) (.91) (.12) (1.2) (.12) 
Girl   .116 -.680 -.606 -.169 -.716 -.226 
   (2.7)*** (2.3)** (1.9)* (.32) (1.7)* (.69) 
         
Control for child and   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
family characteristics         
Control for village    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
characteristics         
Stratum effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations   31033 31033 24533 6500 10331 14202 
Pseudo R2   .146 .148 .151 .190 .109 .142 
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.   Child and family characteristics include: age of the child, number of adults in 
the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether the household is a female headed household, 
father’s education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, 
whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor 
more than 100 days/year, and religion.  Village characteristics include percentage of adults with no schooling, whether there is an 
NGO micro-credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of landless households, percentage of households with 
members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the 
village. 
 
 
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 10 
SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS AND ENROLLMENT: 
BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10 
 
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school = 1 
 Pooled Interacted  
  Level *Girl  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Class size (NGO) .012 .004 .016  
 (.67) (.19) (.78)  
Class size (Gov.) -.008 -.007 -.001  
 (2.5)** (2.2)** (.18)  
% teachers present (NGO) -.577 -.304 -.811  
 (.22) (.11) (0.38)  
% teachers present (Gov.) -.254 -.096 -.497  
 (.48) (.17) (1.1)  
% female teachers (NGO) 1.41 .927 1.04  
 (4.3)*** (2.7)*** (2.3)**  
% female teachers (Gov.) .165 .007 .276  
 (.30) (.01) (.67)  
Teachers' education (NGO) -.026 .002 -.056  
 (.31) (.02) (.89)  
Teachers' education (Gov.) .056 .003 .133  
 (.39) (.02) (1.2)  
Teachers' experience (NGO) -.013 -.027 .019  
 (.44) (.67) (.47)  
Teachers' experience (Gov.) .034 .006 .065  
 (1.3) (.23) (2.7)***  
% of schools with PTAs (NGO) .367 .364 -.005  
 (1.8)* (1.7)* (.03)  
% of schools with PTAs (Gov.) -.047 -.025 -.078  
 (.28) (.15) (.50)  
% of schools with SMCs (NGO) .316 .474 -.331  
 (1.4) (2.0)** (1.7)*  
% of schools with SMCs (Gov.) 1.84 2.72 -1.97  
 (1.5) (1.9)* (1.5)  
     
Control for child and  Yes Yes  
family characteristics    
Control for village Yes Yes  
characteristics    
Stratum effects Yes Yes  
Number of observations 8611 8611  
Pseudo R2 .158 .168  
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  Standard errors are clustered at the village level.   Child and family characteristics include: age of 
the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether 
the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived 
economic status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating 
activities, whether there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and 
religion.  Village characteristics include percentage of adults with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-
credit in the village, average economic status, percentage of landless households, percentage of households with 
members who sell labor more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and percentage of 
Muslims in the village. 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11 
TEST SCORES: BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 11 TO 12 
 
 ABC Life skills Reading Writing Numeracy 
 Level *Girl Level *Girl Level *Girl Level *Girl Level *Girl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Currently attending  .902 2.02 .708 .498 .838 .053 2.35 .468 .384 .105 
NGO school (1.6) (2.5)** (2.6)*** (1.4) (4.6)*** (.20) (5.6)*** (.79) (2.3)** (.45) 
Currently attending  -.046 1.51 -.132 .269 .361 -.030 0.89 .015 .212 -.068 
government school (.10) (1.9)* (.56) (.88) (2.6)** (.16) (3.1)*** (.04) (1.4) (.30) 
Indicator: Girl -1.48  -.850  .604  .383  -.943  
 (1.1)  (1.5)  (1.9)*  (.73)  (4.0)***  
Class passed .761 -.062 .399 -.049 .525 -.005 1.08 .025 .226 .102 
 (8.6)*** (.53) (9.3)*** (.87) (17.4)*** (.12) (17.5)*** (.31) (9.0)*** (2.7)***
Listen to the radio .526 -.494 .226 .029 .136 -.026 .200 -.201 -.014 .074 
 (3.1)*** (2.0)** (2.5)** (.23) (2.1)** (.28) (1.6) (1.0) (.26) (.94) 
Watch television -.058 .140 .208 -.061 .041 -.110 -.013 -.061 .039 -.144 
 (.32) (.62) (2.0)** (.46) (.55) (1.1) (.10) (.33) (.71) (1.7)* 
Read newspaper .973 .078 .366 .048 -.090 .427 -.030 .686 -.023 .218 
 (2.9)*** (.18) (2.6)** (.20) (.90) (2.9)*** (.15) (2.0)** (.38) (1.9)* 
Father's education .035 .005 .016 .001 .019 .002 .051 .004 -.002 -.000 
 (1.4) (.14) (1.1) (.03) (1.8)* (.15) (2.7)*** (.14) (.22) (.02) 
Mother’s education  .054 -.028 .011 .024 -.018 .013 -.003 .019 .010 -.003 
 (1.5) (.58) (.56) (.96) (1.4) (.75) (.11) (.55) (1.1) (.18) 
Always in deficit -.206 .341 .096 .017 -.073 .013 -.159 .047 .034 .059 
 (.83) (1.0) (.71) (.10) (.81) (.11) (.89) (.19) (.43) (.53) 
Sometimes in deficit -.252 .331 -.078 .006 -.066 .086 -.256 .180 -.010 .106 
 (1.3) (1.1) (.63) (.04) (.83) (.71) (1.7) (.78) (.15) (1.2) 
Surplus -.540 .708 -.153 .022 -.237 .343 -.614 .683 -.072 .181 
 (1.9)* (1.9)* (.99) (.11) (2.0)** (2.1)** (2.7)*** (2.2)** (.92) (1.5) 
Mother: access to NGO credit -.037 .294 .156 -.026 -.070 .146 -.164 .089 .035 .028 
 (.16) (.95) (1.4) (.16) (.70) (1.2) (.86) (.38) (.53) (.29) 
Mother: involve in income .010 -.125 -.067 .115 -.051 -.031 -.122 -.138 .030 -.030 
generating activities (.05) (.48) (.62) (.78) (.64) (.29) (.78) (.69) (.50) (.33) 
At least 1 member of hh .215 -.179 .026 -.170 .037 -.153 .052 -.197 .029 .060 
sells labor 100  days/year + (1.1) (.65) (.26) (1.2) (.52) (1.6) (.35) (1.0) (.53) (.70) 
      
Control for other family charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
and other school types      
Village effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3061 3324 3324 3324 3324 
Pseudo R2 / Adjusted R2 .339 .363 .518 .577 .295 
For columns (1) and (2), absolute z-statistics are in parentheses.  For columns (3) to (10), absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  Standard errors are clustered at the village level.  Child and family 
characteristics include: age of the child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, 
whether the household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived economic status, 
whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether there is at least one member of 
the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion. 
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TABLE 12 
DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: BOYS AND GIRLS AGED 6 TO 10 
 
Dependent variable: Currently enrolled in school = 1 
  All Bangladesh   Rural Urban  
 Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NGO school involvement  -.862 -.444 -.870 -.403 -1.73 -2.10 
 (2.2)** (-1.0) (1.7)* (.77) (2.3)** (2.0)** 
Government school involvement .039 .130 -.140 -.142 .045 -.063 
 (.24) (.71) (.75) (.73) (.10) (.10) 
Number adults .080 .080 .094 .111 .019 -.018 
 (3.9)*** (4.1)*** (4.2)*** (5.0)*** (.40) (.49) 
Number siblings -.036 -.058 -.057 -.074 .059 -.004 
 (2.3)** (3.5)*** (3.5)*** (4.1)*** (1.7)* (.10) 
Percentage of boys -.447 .174 -.463 .168 -.382 .197 
 (5.0)*** (1.5) (4.5)*** (1.3) (2.1)** (.82) 
Female head of household -.213 -.052 -.257 -.082 .070 .129 
 (1.9)* (.38) (2.1)** (.53) (.21) (.39) 
Father's education .078 .107 .093 .116 .042 .090 
 (8.6)*** (10.4)*** (8.9)*** (10.7)*** (2.2)** (4.1)*** 
Mother's education .139 .140 .128 .126 .193 .188 
 (10.5)*** (9.2)*** (8.3)*** (6.7)*** (7.1)*** (6.6)*** 
Always in deficit -.530 -.536 -.512 -.571 -.642 -.311 
 (7.6)*** (7.1)*** (6.7)*** (6.8)*** (4.2)*** (2.0)** 
Sometimes in deficit -.106 -.100 -.143 -.184 .005 .199 
 (1.7)** (1.3) (2.1)** (2.2)** (.04) (1.3) 
Surplus .168 -.432 .120 -.111 .315 -.731 
 (1.6) (3.1)*** (.94) (.75) (1.7)* (3.3)*** 
Mother: access to NGO credit .257 .285 .172 .189 .667 .637 
 (3.3)*** (3.6)*** (2.1)** (2.3)** (4.1)*** (3.4)*** 
Mother: income generating -.009 -.132 .054 -.108 -.391 -.333 
activities (.16) (1.9)** (.84) (1.3) (3.6)*** (2.7)*** 
At lease 1 household member  -.490 -.357 -.537 -.364 -.308 -.394 
sells labour 100 days/year + (9.7)*** (6.2)*** (9.6)*** (5.7)*** (2.9)*** (3.3)*** 
       
Stratum effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 15846 15187 12568 11965 3278 3222 
Pseudo R2 .143 .153 .140 .162 .191 .185 
Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.  Child and family characteristics include: age of the 
child, number of adults in the household, number of siblings, percentage of boys among all siblings, whether the 
household is a female headed household, father’s education, mother’s education, household’s self-perceived economic 
status, whether mother has access to NGO credit, whether mother is engaged in income-generating activities, whether 
there is at least one member of the household who sells labor more than 100 days/year, and religion.  Village
characteristics include percentage of adults with no schooling, whether there is an NGO micro-credit in the village, 
average economic status, percentage of landless households, percentage of households with members who sell labor 
more than 100 days/year, percentage of female headed households, and percentage of Muslims in the village. 
Percentage of adults with no schooling has a negative and significant relationship with the probability of being enrolled 
for both boys and girls.  Percentage of households with members who sell labor more than 100 days/year has a positive 
and significant relationship with the probability of being enrolled for boys.  All other village characteristics are 
insignificant. 
 
   
        
0
50
100
150
200
250
1963 1984 1985 1986 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Year
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
N
G
O
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
i
n
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
W
a
t
c
h
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
All Bangladesh Rural areas Urban areas
 
 
FIGURE 1: EXPANSION OF NGO SCHOOLS IN BANGLADESH  
 
        Notes: All variables refer to the cumulative number of NGO schools.  The variables are constructed using information from the 1998 Education Watch data.   
        The Data Appendix provides a full description of the data. 
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FIGURE 2A: NET ENROLLMENT IN BANGLADESH 
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FIGURE 2B: NET ENROLLMENT AND SELF PERCEIVED ECONOMIC 
STATUS IN RURAL BANGLADESH 
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FIGURE 2C: NET ENROLLMENT AND SELF PERCEIVED ECONOMIC 
STATUS IN URBAN BANGLADESH 
 
 
Notes:  The variables are constructed using information from the 1998 Education Watch data.  The Data Appendix 
provides a full description of the data.  BRAC target households are defined as households with less than 0.5 acre 
of land and at least 1 person engaged in manual labor for at least 100 days a year (Nath, 1999). 
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FIGURE 3A: NET ENROLLMENT IN BANGLADESH, INDIA, AND NEPAL:  
BY AREA 
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FIGURE 3B: NET ENROLLMENT IN BANGLADESH, INDIA, AND NEPAL:  
BY ECONOMIC STATUS 
 
 
Notes: The variables are constructed using information from the Demographic and Health Survey 
(Bangladesh 1999, India 1998/99, and Nepal 2001), as reported in the data sheet in support of Filmer 
(2003). 
 
 
 
 
